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ABSTRACT
Until recently, electricity utilities in mid- and low-latitude regions believed that solar storms had no (or only insignificant) effect on
their power systems. Then it was noticed that the onset of damage in several large transformers, leading to their failure, correlated
very closely with the Halloween storm of 2003. Since then engineers have started to appreciate that a very severe storm could have
serious consequences outside the high-latitude regions. There are many uncertainties in predicting the effects of solar storms on
electrical systems. The severity and time of arrival of a storm are difficult to model; so are the geomagnetically induced currents
(GICs) expected to flow in the power networks. Published information about the responses of different types of transformers to
GICs is contradictory. Measurements of the abnormal power flows in networks during solar storms generally do not take into ac-
count the effects of the current distortion and unbalance, potentially giving misleading signals to the operators. The normal require-
ment for optimum system management, while allowing for the possibility of faults caused by lightning, birds and other causes,
limits the capacity of system operators to respond to the threats of GICs, which are not assessed easily by the N  1 reliability
criterion. A utility’s response to the threat of damage by GICs depends on the expected frequency and magnitude of solar storms.
Approaches to formulating a response are located in a system model incorporating space physics, network analysis, transformer
engineering, network reliability and decision support and the benefits are identified. Approaches adopted in high-latitude regions
might not be appropriate where fewer storms are expected to reach damaging levels. The risks of an extreme storm cannot be ig-
nored, and understanding the response mechanisms suitable for low-latitude regions has the capacity to inform and reduce the
uncertainty for power systems planners and operators worldwide.
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1. Awareness of a problem
Complexity contributes to uncertainty. Large power systems are
complex, comprising many components and operating under
variable conditions to meet the constantly changing require-
ments of the customers for power.
Components of the power system fail for diverse reasons,
including ageing, corrosion, lightning and human interference.
Redundancy is provided to reduce the effects of component
failure, but still some customers’ supplies are interrupted when
too many components fail and, in extreme situations, the col-
lapse of a whole system causes widespread blackouts such as
in North America and Italy in 2003 (Andersson et al. 2005)
and India during 2012 (Ministry of Power 2012).
A system with sufficient redundancy is able to continue
supplying the customers in spite of an unexpected component
failure, and is said to be operating in a normal state. The reserve
margin, a term mostly used to describe generation capacity, rep-
resents the redundancy available to make up for the loss of any
component, termed a contingency event. When there is insuffi-
cient redundancy, the loss of one or more key components (gen-
erators, transformers and/or feeders) initiates interruptions.
However, the real problem starts before the component or a
combination of components is lost. External events, internal
degradation and loading all contribute together to the likelihood
that contingencies will exceed the compensation capacity of the
system. Providing enormous redundancy is feasible but too
costly. Therefore, system planners and operators need to find
optimum conditions, continuously.
Planners and operators develop a good understanding of the
most common problems and operating conditions. Less fre-
quent phenomena, when external threats affect many network
components at the same time, are less well understood, espe-
cially when the threat itself is virtually invisible and its region
of influence poorly defined, as with geomagnetic disturbances.
Geomagnetic storms severe enough to disrupt power sys-
tems are uncommon and, until recently, were thought to have
no effect on power systems in low-latitude regions. This is
not really surprising, since the mechanisms leading to failure
were relatively poorly understood. Investigations in South
Africa during the 1990s, after the Quebec storm of 1989, found
no evidence that geomagnetic storms were a problem. Both the
power system and the effects of geomagnetic storms are com-
plex and, with the hindsight of our present understanding, the
conclusions of those investigations are not surprising.
The Halloween storm of October 2003 led to a different
conclusion – that solar events could affect power systems in
low-latitude regions. The conclusion that geomagnetically
induced currents (GICs) could be a problem (Gaunt & Coetzee
2007) was disputed. Subsequently research in other countries
has shown that significant GICs are not limited to high-latitude
regions (Liu et al. 2009; Torta et al. 2012). Initially the mech-
anisms of failures apparently initiated by GICs were not well
understood and the failures that had occurred were attributed
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to various other causes. The situation is outside the normal
experience of system planners and operators and cannot be rep-
resented by average conditions. The complexity of predicting
geomagnetic disturbances (GMDs) and their effects on power
systems create substantial uncertainty for electricity utilities
(Thomson et al. 2010)
This paper presents the findings of some research under-
taken since 2007 to reduce that uncertainty.
2. Model of the system
The system needing to be considered is greater than a power
system. It includes those events on the sun that initiate GICs
and extends to the possible responses of the utility. Figure 1
shows a model of the system used in our research.
The system has five sub-systems incorporating these
elements:
Space physics includes the processes from disturbances on
the Sun to the induction at Earth of the voltages that drive
GICs in the power system.
Network analysis calculates the actual currents in the net-
work’s lines and transformers, including the GICs and the
effects on the network of the transformer response.
Transformer engineering investigates the responses of the
transformers to the induced currents, including the transient
response to quasi-dc, the generation of harmonics that dis-
tort the power frequency sinusoidal voltages and currents,
the processes of overheating and the degradation and failure
of the transformers.
Network reliability and cost assessment considers the per-
formance of the network as a whole, affected by other
threats as well as GICs, and the likely damage cost associ-
ated with any operating condition.
Decision support for network planners and system control-
lers models the implications of alternative approaches to
preventing or mitigating the system responses of physical
and financial damage that can be caused by GICs.
2.1. Space physics
Space physics models the propagation of solar activity events
through the heliosphere, their interaction with the Earth’s mag-
netosphere, the resulting disturbances of the Earth’s magnetic
field, and the induced voltages that drive the GICs in electrical
conductors like power lines.
The severity of geomagnetic disturbances is not represented
by the size of the solar cycle peak. The magnitudes of the most
severe disturbances in each solar cycle, measured (or for some
earlier events estimated from other parameters) by the widely
used 3-hourly index aa, do not vary much with the magnitudes
of the solar cycles as measured by sunspot number. The peak
sunspot number of the solar cycles when two of the most severe
GMDs recorded (in 1859 and 1921) occurred were quite similar
to that of the present solar cycle expected to peak during 2013.
So, existing indices like the aa index might not be suitable indi-
cators of the severity of disturbances on power systems.
It is clear that several storms have been more severe, in
terms of extended periods of large time derivatives of the geo-
magnetic field and the induced GICs, than the Halloween storm
that is believed to have been the initiator of significant damage
to transformers in the South African power system during 2003.
It is now over 150 years since the extreme storm known as the
Carrington event in 1859, and the likelihood of another similar
or larger disturbance is of great interest to power systems
engineers.
The frequency of extreme disturbances has been studied by
various researchers (Thomson et al. 2011; Pulkkinen et al.
2012). Although probability distributions do not address the
uncertainty of when severe and extreme events will occur, they
do reduce the uncertainty in modelling the maximum likely
stress on the power systems.
Building on work done in other countries, electric field
interpolation techniques have been used to model the conditions
in South Africa during GMDs. Figure 2 (Bernhardi et al. 2008)
illustrates how non-uniform the field was at one stage of the
Halloween storm and that it was closely aligned to the topology
of the main transmission network. Similar maps at 2-minute
intervals show the field was turbulent in respect of magnitude
and direction for several hours. Clearly, early assumptions of
a uniform plane wave model were quite inaccurate. Figure 2
shows three of the magnetic observatories in Southern Africa
at Hermanus, Hartebeeshoek, Tsumeb and another is now oper-
ational at Keetmanshoop, South of Windhoek.
The severity and characteristics of disturbances in South
Africa might reasonably be expected to be similar to distur-
bances at other locations of similar geomagnetic latitude, such
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Fig. 2. Grid of interpolated horizontal electric field over Southern
Africa on 29 October 2003 at 06:40, calculated using measured
magnetic fields at three observatories.
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as in North America, Europe, China and Australia. However,
the expectation is coarse and does not take into account the time
of day, the possible interaction between the equatorial ring cur-
rent and polar electrojets during significant disturbances, and
the different ground resistivity in different regions. Research
on these aspects will be useful as a basis for comparing power
system responses in the various regions, and further reducing
uncertainty.
Space physics also contributes the models of induced cur-
rent in the branches of the power system network connecting
the nodes (substations) where transformers are installed with
the neutral points earthed (grounded). GICs flow in loops illus-
trated in Figure 3 created by:
d the conductors of high voltage transmission lines, usually
comprising two or more sub-conductors for each of three
phases of the alternating current power system but pro-
viding effectively a single composite conductor for the
quasi-dc GIC,
d the star- or Y-connected windings of the transformers at
each end that have the neutrals earthed for the purposes
of safety, operations control and reducing the cost of
the transformers and
d the conductance of the Earth through which the current
disperses widely. Although it is dispersed, the current is
often represented as an equivalent current at a particular
depth. The deep, dispersed path is often referred to as
‘‘true Earth’’ because its very low resistance is dominated
by the localised electrical connections to it of the trans-
former neutrals in the substations.
The variation of the magnetic field, and thus the induced
current, has a typical cycle time of minutes (~0.01 Hz), which
is very slow compared with the rate of change of voltage and
current in the power system (50 or 60 Hz). Therefore, power
systems engineers often refer to GICs as being quasi-dc in their
character, but it is important to realise that the currents do vary
slowly and with different components of frequency. Since the
effective depth (tens to hundreds of kilometres) at which the
equivalent current flows in the ‘‘true Earth’’ changes with the
effective frequency, the area of the current loop depicted in
Figure 3 varies and the relationship between the magnetic flux
change and the induced E-field is also not constant.
Of course, post-event calculations of field conditions and
induced currents are useful for research, but the operations con-
trol staff of an electricity utility need real-time data and, prefer-
ably, forecasts of storm onset and severity about 6 h ahead.
These models are not yet available. More accurate modelling
based on measurements at the Lagrange point L1, giving about
20 min warning during extreme events, would be useful in
reducing uncertainty.
2.2. Network analysis
Network analysis, based on models of GIC induced in the over-
head lines of the transmission network, calculates the currents
expected to flow in the substation transformers. It is well known
that the magnitudes of the induced currents in the lines and
transformers depend on the characteristics of the GMD, the
resistivity of the ground and the network configuration (topol-
ogy and conductor resistances). Until recently, network analysis
has not taken into account the time delay that arises from the
charging of a large transformer – an inductance – by the
quasi-dc GIC, and the way the transformers’ responses over
several minutes to step changes of induced voltage effectively
filter the prospective GIC (Oyedokun et al. 2013). As shown
by the turbulent field modelling, the calculation of network
and transformer currents is a dynamic process, and it is also
influenced by the physical construction of the transformers.
Three-phase 3- or 5-limb and single-phase transformers all
respond differently to imposed GIC potentials, and the network
analysis must take the differences into account.
New approaches to network calculations, from basic
principles and based on mapping a disturbance to the response,
are being attempted. Good agreement between calculated
currents in transformer neutrals and measurements recorded dur-
ing large geomagnetic disturbances in 2001, 2003 and 2004 has
been achieved. Even small disturbances, such as have occurred
several times alreadyduring the present solar cycle, producemea-
surable responses in the transformers. Reliable current measure-
ments in the neutrals of many transformers in many parts of the
network are needed to calibrate the calculations more
accurately, and these are now being put in place. The new
approaches, after testing with even small signals from minor
GMDs, could successfully model more intense storms.
Network analysis also calculates the power flow in the sys-
tem, essential for understanding the network’s capacity to main-
tain acceptable voltage conditions. It is widely known that GICs
flowing in transformers increase the non-active (reactive) power
required from the system (Molinski 2002), explaining the unu-
sual real and reactive power swings and voltage depressions
observed during the Quebec storm (Kappenman & Albertson
1990). More recent work has shown that a new definition and
method of measuring apparent power and power factor is needed
to allow potential voltage-instability conditions on a network to
be interpreted correctly under conditions of distortion, unbalance
and with dc components (Malengret & Gaunt 2011, and com-
panion papers). Laboratory-scale measurements and simulations
have shown that the power factor, reflecting the effective capac-
ity of a system to deliver power, is substantially lower than indi-
cated by conventional measurements when dc components flow
in transformers (Gaunt & Malengret 2012). Since a recent
NERC report on reliability concludes
The most likely worst case system impact from a severe
GMD event and corresponding GIC flow is voltage insta-
bility caused by a significant loss of reactive power sup-
port simultaneous to a dramatic increase in reactive
power demand (NERC 2012),
the new approach could help operators to identify the best
system configurations.
2.3. Transformer engineering
The GIC component of the current flowing in a transformer dis-
turbs the normal power-frequency operation of the magnetic
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Fig. 3. Induction of GICs in the power transmission system.
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circuit, causing core saturation, increasing the leakage flux and
generating harmonic distortion and voltage unbalance. These
effects in the transformers have the capacity to cause overheat-
ing and damage that depend on the design of the transformers
and the load being carried, as well as on the magnitude, varia-
tion and duration of the induced currents.
The NERC report (2012) identifies the most likely impact
of extreme GICs on power systems as voltage instability, but
it also recognises the risk of damage to transformers and other
equipment, and that restoration times for damaged equipment
would be much longer than for a power system collapse. Power
system collapse during extreme geomagnetic disturbances
could protect equipment from damage but when disturbances
are less severe, or in regions not so severely affected by an
extreme event, the transformers and other equipment may be
exposed for long periods to potentially damaging currents. It
is difficult to predict completely the damage likely in a trans-
former because of the many variables, but continual progress
is being made in the modelling of currents, the heating effects,
transformer condition monitoring and fault investigation.
Although intense GMDs have been associated with physi-
cal melting of steel components of transformers (Kappenman
& Albertson 1990), the nature of damage in transformers at
mid-latitudes is quite different. It is postulated there are many
different routes to failure, according to the conditions in the
transformer at GIC commencement. For example, in appropri-
ate conditions, bubbles can form within a winding if leakage
flux and eddy currents cause rapid heating and change the mois-
ture equilibrium between the oil and paper insulation. Flux
shunts on the core overheated by leakage flux can burn the
oil, also generating bubbles that can be drawn into the winding
by cooling oil flow. Bubbles are known to be sites for partial
discharges that damage the paper insulation, and in a labora-
tory-scale experiment it was found that partial discharge could
be turned on and off by very small dc currents injected through
a transformer (Oyedokun et al. 2011). Alternatively, overheat-
ing is associated with sulphur deposition in some transformer
oils, leading to a different mechanism of breakdown. Damage
initiated by GICs might become self-sustaining, leading to pro-
gressive deterioration and eventually failure.
Several dissolved gas analysis (DGA) records from genera-
tor step-up transformers after the Halloween storm showed the
sort of trends that would be expected from these kinds of failure
mechanisms. Figure 4 illustrates an increase of gas content
starting around the date of the storm. Despite unloading the
transformer for a period and filtering the oil in other transform-
ers, seven units with this characteristic increase in dissolved
gases starting at the end of October continued to failure within
one year. The failed transformers were not especially old, and
most were considered to be around half life at their time of
failure.
The interpretation of DGA records like the one shown in
Figure 4 is time consuming and difficult, so the trajectories of
some gases might even be omitted, especially when the damage
caused by the GICs is not immediately evident. Therefore, the
DGA measurements of the key gases (hydrogen, methane and
carbon monoxide) associated with low-energy degradation of
paper and oil have been combined in a triangular representation
of the transformer health (Moodley & Gaunt 2012). The low-
energy degradation triangle is similar in appearance to the
Duval triangles already used in some utilities for transformer
monitoring, but it focuses on insulation degradation at low tem-
peratures. It is interpreted differently, since results in the left
bottom vertex of the triangle represent a healthy transformer
and movement away from this vertex indicates increasing deg-
radation. The low-energy degradation triangle illustrated in
Figure 5 clearly depicts the progress to failure of a 700 MVA
GSU transformer similar to the one depicted in Figure 4. The
analysis supports the conclusion that the Halloween storm con-
tributed to this transformer’s failure (Gaunt & Coetzee 2007),
but additionally a similar weaker response, not previously iden-
tified, appears to have occurred after the smaller storms of
2001. Although the unit was repaired and returned to service
in May 2003, the GICs in October and November 2003 clearly
accelerated a different failure after the Halloween storm.
The trend towards failure illustrated in this example repre-
sents only one of the failure mechanisms that occur in trans-
formers. Other characteristic patterns have been identified,
associated with different failure processes in other transformers.
This new tool for transformer condition monitoring is easily
automated for on-line dissolved gas monitoring. In the past,
transformer failure prediction has been very uncertain, both
generally and when caused by GICs, but now can be substan-
tially improved.
2.4. Network reliability and cost assessment
Transformers are not the only components in the network dis-
rupted by the effects of GMDs. The distortion of the power fre-
quency voltage and current by GICs in the transformers can
affect capacitors, protection relays and the non-active (previ-
ously called reactive) power flow essential for network voltage
stability. GPS-based communication and protection may mal-
operate or fail if the satellites lose lock as might occur during
severe events. GIC warning systems dependent on Internet-
based systems might similarly not perform reliably.
In addition, system operators need always to consider the
effects of all other causes of coincident component and system
failure. In South Africa the dominant external causes of faults
on the main transmission system are birds, lightning, fires
and pollution, together accounting for nearly 90% of all line
faults (Minnaar et al. 2012). GICs are uncommon initiators of
faults, although the effects may be widespread, making inappro-
priate the adoption of the usual reliability criterion of N  1
independent outage contingencies. Further, exposures of sys-
tems to GICs are of very limited duration relative to the life
of the power system assets. Therefore, new techniques are
needed to analyse the multiple contingency effects associated
with both large power systems and the simultaneous exposure
of many components to the threat of GICs.
Lightning, birds, fires and pollution all have distinct sea-
sonal and time of day patterns. The demand on the system
Fig. 4. DGA record of generator step-up transformer showing
gassing starting end October.
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exhibits similar patterns. Based on these properties, a time-
dependant probabilistic approach has been developed for reli-
ability analysis. Defining four seasons and four times of day,
the vulnerability of components to all adverse external threats
is modelled by Beta probability density functions for each sea-
son- and time-period (Minnaar et al. 2012). A consistent
approach can then be taken to Monte Carlo modelling of sys-
tem failure for both planning and operations (Edimu et al.
2013). The approach copes effectively with the time-dependant
correlation between threats and demand.
The costs of interruptions to customers can be applied to the
output of the reliability (or failure) analysis. Surveys have identi-
fied that interruption costs also correlate with business activity
levels according to the seasons and time of day and can also be
represented by Beta probability density functions. The costs of
interruptions at each busbar are aggregated for the customer
mix. The aggregate cost is combined with the probability of fail-
ure at each busbar, allowing the total value at risk to be identified
for the system configuration. The total cost is also a Beta proba-
bility distribution, from which singular values can be extracted
for a given level of confidence or risk (Dzobo et al. 2012).
2.5. Decision support
The whole combination of the five sub-systems can be used for
testing the cost-effectiveness of various approaches to prevent-
ing or mitigating the effects of GICs in power systems. The
integrated approach is needed because the system is large and
complex and characterised by uncertainty. Understanding the
implications of any decision is beyond the scope of more sim-
ple, disconnected ‘‘solutions’’.
For example, the flow of GICs in a power system can be
interrupted by installing series capacitors in the lines making
up the network. Although this is costly, causes redistribution
of GICs in circuits that are not blocked, and might introduce
problems of sub-synchronous resonance, the expense is justi-
fied in regions where GICs are sufficiently common to justify
the cost of protecting the assets. In low-latitude regions, such
as South Africa, the solution could work, but cannot be justified
financially, so alternatives must be considered. However, such
alternatives have not been implemented widely, so there is little
experience available locally or internationally to guide the deci-
sion-making. In the absence of that experience or other ways to
find the best solutions to the problems of transformer failure
and the threat of an extreme storm, a completely integrated
approach to the whole system is needed.
An advantage of the modular design of the integrated sys-
tem is that the modules can be developed in parallel. Further,
as the ways of dealing with the complexity within each module
are improved, the whole system becomes incrementally better
at guiding the various decisions, including the final outputs
for planning and operations.
3. Benefits
Another advantage of taking a systems approach to the threat of
solar storms is that the whole is greater than the sum of the
Fig. 5. Low-energy degradation triangle for transformer health assessment (Moodley & Gaunt 2012).
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parts. The above descriptions of sub-systems show that the
approaches have been conceived to feed into each other, so
the whole system moves raw data from various sources towards
decision support. At the same time, each process has outputs
that feed into completely different systems. A few examples
must suffice to illustrate the extra benefits derived from the
research.
The work on the definition and measurement of power
under non-ideal conditions was initiated by twin needs – to
design power electronic controllers to correct power quality
problems and connect renewable energy sources to the grid,
and to understand better the distortion and performance of
power systems in the presence of GICs.
The low-energy degradation triangle was developed to
address specifically the uncertainty about the mechanisms of
failure of transformers in our region. The need was evident
because transformer failures were too numerous to be coinci-
dental, yet could not be fully explained by what was known
about GICs. The solution conceived to analyse what was hap-
pening turns out to be a tool suitable also for the early detection
of low-energy degradation and warning of incipient failure. The
tool can be incorporated, virtually unchanged, in standard pro-
grammes for transformer condition monitoring and asset
management.
As knowledge of the transformer degradation processes
improved, a better understanding was gained of the most rele-
vant parameters of GMDs. Without interfering in the scientific
research of space physicists, the definition of distinct applica-
tions has provoked new approaches for some of that research.
We determined that reliability analysis could be improved
by adopting a 16-cell, time-based matrix of inputs to reduce
the complexity of dealing with continuous functions in Monte
Carlo simulations. At the same time, the output can be mod-
elled as a probability to be interpreted with a level of confi-
dence. The approach required classifying existing failure data
in a new way, which has had spin-off already in identifying
ways to improve transmission system reliability. The same
time-dependant approach allows reliability analysis to be
applied to long term planning and short term (6-h periods) oper-
ations control using closely related algorithms, common input
data and consistent interpretation of the results of simulations.
Although developed to address specifically the uncertainties
of high impact, low frequency GIC events, several of the tech-
niques provide new tools suitable for extreme events other than
those related to GICs, as well as for normal, everyday planning
and control.
Finally, from the point of view of a university, the research
has served as a vehicle for the intellectual training of a relatively
large number of students, several of whom have already found
responsible positions in industry.
4. Implementation
There is still a gap between having a plan or design and having
a working project in place. The plan was conceived in 2004 and
design has progressed according to the availability of resources
– both funds and people. Many problems have been solved in
the process. The work has also identified new possibilities for
improvement in this project and applying the evolving tech-
niques in other projects.
Completely new algorithms and tools have been developed
and tested as far as is possible using limited data. Much of the
work has already been published in various forms for critical
review. However, the real benefits will only be realised when
the design is put into use. We do not underestimate the effort
required to ensure that every practical detail is working
properly.
It is also recognised that implementation of a warning and
mitigation system for responding to extreme geomagnetic
events is not trivial. In addition to the algorithms, techniques
and understanding already developed, there is a need for instru-
mentation, communications and procedures to use the informa-
tion derived from on-line monitoring and reliability analysis,
and for training the utilities’ personnel, particularly those in
control centres.
5. Conclusion
We still do not know when the next extreme geomagnetic storm
will arrive, but the research so far has provided two key results
to supplement the work of others:
The processes from GMD to power system failure can be
formulated in a large but coherent model to analyse the
complexity and manage the uncertainty; and
The improved understanding allows better responses to the
threats of severe and extreme geomagnetic storms to be
planned in advance and in ways that were not envisaged
in March 1989 and October 2003.
Research of this nature cannot prevent severe solar storms
affecting power systems, but can help in mitigating and manag-
ing the outcomes more effectively.
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